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Current research on moral identity shows that moral identity predicts moral action in
Western cultures but not in non-Western cultures. The present paper argues that this
may be due to the fact that the concept of moral identity is culturally biased. In order to
remedy this situation, we argue that researchers should broaden their scopes of inquiry
by adding a cultural lens to their studies of moral identity. This change is important
because although some concept of moral identity likely exists in all cultures, it may
function in different ways and at different levels in each place. We propose that moral
identity is a context-dependent construct tied to varying social and cultural obligations.
We argue that Western moral identity stresses an individually oriented morality, whereas,
people from Eastern cultures consider a highly moral person to be societally oriented.
We conclude by discussing the implications of this view for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers have tried to explain
why people act morally. Kohlberg’s (1969) stage theory of moral development served this task
for decades by investigating how moral reasoning influences moral behaviors in hypothetical
situations. While Kohlberg’s theory provided insight about the development of moral reasoning
skills, his theory is limited because moral reasoning alone is not a strong predictor of moral
action (e.g., Blasi, 1983). In an attempt to improve our understanding of why people act morally,
researchers have taken on a new approach to moral psychology, which attempts to find a link
between moral judgment and moral action. This new approach has raised an interest in the topic
of moral identity, which Hardy and Carlo define as “the degree to which being a moral person is
important to an individual’s identity” (Hardy and Carlo, 2005, p. 212). Studies have demonstrated
that people do appear to form moral identities and that internalizing one’s moral identity can
influence moral action (e.g., Krettenauer et al., 2016). While this line of research is promising, some
researchers have questioned whether moral identity actually motivates one to act in a moral fashion
in non-Western cultures. However, this is problematic because cultural psychologists suggest that
people both within and across cultures have different self-concepts, cognitive processes, emotional
expectations, and value orientations (Krettenauer and Jia, 2013). Therefore, this paper seeks to
address this question by suggesting a culturally inclusive approach to investigating moral identity.
First, we will review cultural criticism on moral psychology in general. Next, we will discuss a
cultural framework to study moral identity.
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MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURAL
CRITICISM
Lawrence Kohlberg’s work has heavily influenced the
development of moral psychology. His model of moral
reasoning and judgment is based, in part, on Piaget’s model of
cognitive development. Kohlberg’s theory of moral development
(Kohlberg, 1969) proposes six universal stages of development
of moral reasoning. This sequence begins with children’s focus
on avoiding punishment by authority (Stage 1) and potentially
ends with an endorsement of universal principles of justices and
rights (Stage 6). The findings from a number of cross-cultural
studies have suggested that some aspects of Kohlberg’s theory of
morality are universal. For example, Gibbs et al. (2007) revisited
Kohlberg’s universality claims by reviewing 75 cross-cultural
studies conducted in 23 countries. From this investigation, Gibbs
et al. (2007) concluded that there is evidence that Kohlberg’s first
four stages may be universal.
However, many researchers have raised concerns regarding
the failure of these theories to account for the moral concepts
of individuals across diverse cultures (e.g., Dien, 1982). These
researchers contend that focusing on concepts of justice,
fairness, and harm to individuals and excluding concepts of
interdependence, social harmony, and the role of cultural
socialization in non-Western settings. This concern is grounded
in Western philosophical thought and in the cultural milieu
in which Kohlberg developed his theory in the Midwestern
United States in the 1950s. Although Western notions of
individualism may have been appropriate to describe his
theory at the time and place, those same notions may not
represent universal moral principles applicable to all people of all
cultures.
Since Kohlberg’s time, other scholars have proposed different
models to describe moral development for a broad range of
cultures. Shweder et al. (1997) have outlined a different approach
to moral development, which posits three ethics that are central
to the moral belief systems in the majority of cultures around
the world: autonomy, community, and divinity. This method of
differentiating types of morality not only shows different domains
of morality, but also gives us insight into cultural variations
(Shweder et al., 1997). For example, there is a more pronounced
emphasis on the ethic of community in Taiwan than in the United
States and a stronger emphasis on the ethic of autonomy in the
United States than in Taiwan (Vauclair and Fischer, 2011).
In his article “The new synthesis in moral psychology,”
Haidt (2007) expands Shweder’s theory by proposing the Moral
Foundations Model. In opposition to rational theories of
moral reasoning, he argues that morality is a quick, automatic
process that has formed over human evolution. According to
Haidt (2007), the five moral foundations are harm, fairness,
ingroup, authority, and purity. In an attempt to determine
which moral foundation people endorse, several researchers
tested the Moral Foundation Model cross-culturally. One study
used a cross-cultural sample, which included participants from
Eastern cultures (South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia)
and participants from Western cultures (US, UK, Canada,
and Western Europe). Haidt found that Eastern participants
showed stronger concerns about ingroup and purity compared
to Western participants and that Eastern participants were also
slightly more concerned about authority.
This examination of the moral psychology literature, which
includes Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning, Shweder’s ethical
codes, and Haidt’s moral foundations, suggests that morality is
not culturally universal. People around the world may share
the same moral foundations ethical codes, and moral reasoning,
but there is much disagreement about their relative importance
across cultures. This paper applies a cultural approach to studying
morality by focusing on how cultures develop specific ways of
thinking and foster certain values (Norenzayan and Heine, 2005).
This approach recognizes that there may be some basic universal
moral principles, but it argues for powerful influences of culture
on various aspects of morality.
MORAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL
INCLUSIVENESS
Recent research in moral psychology has suggested that one can
obtain a fuller understanding of moral action by considering
the role of the self in morality, which is often termed “moral
identity.” Hardy and Carlo explain that moral identity refers
to “the degree to which being a moral person is important to
an individual’s identity” (Hardy and Carlo, 2005, pp. 212). In
other words, if individuals feel that moral values such as being
honest, compassionate, fair, and generous are central for defining
their personal identity, they have a strong moral identity. While
research in this area continues to convince people that moral
identity, in Western societies, plays an important part in moral
functioning, links between moral identity and non-Western
culture remain unclear. For example, Hertz and Krettenauer
(2016) conducted a meta-analysis to examine the relationship
between moral identity and moral action. Their study included
111 articles from a variety of academic journals. In general, they
found a positive correlation between moral identity and moral
behavior. However, effect sizes varied in those studies. The effect
size was much lower in non-Western cultures than in Western
cultures. The authors suggest that the low effect size might be
due to different conceptualizations of moral identity between
cultures or due to the lack of validity of the current moral identity
measures in non-Western cultures. These results call the field’s
attention to the issue of ‘cultural uniqueness’ and, thus, they stress
an urgent need to assess moral identity in non-Western societies
as well as Western ones in order to obtain less biased results.
In his book “Identity and The Life Cycle,” Erikson (1980)
considers the way in which we study identity development.
He proposes that, in addition to considering ego and personal
identity, we should also incorporate cultural context. This is
because while ego and personal identity are intrapersonal context
areas that lead us to consider personal characteristics and sense
of self, adding the cultural context helps us to expand our
understanding by encouraging us to consider categories such
as native language, country of origin, and racial background.
Erikson’s concept of identity aims to establish a social-cultural
approach that encompasses all elements of the self, which
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includes the most internal ego conflicts to the individual’s
embeddedness in a cultural context (Schwartz, 2001). This
organization reflects Erikson’s view that lifespan development
occurs at the interface of self and culture. As a result, identity
represents a coherent picture that one shows to both oneself and
to the outside world. Thus, moral identity research should not
only focus on individual levels, but on a cultural level as well. To
what extent moral identity is a function of interacting in a specific
culture is a major question that has only recently been raised in
moral identity research.
Like many other moral constructs, the moral identity concept
is rooted in a Western cultural context that stresses an
individually oriented morality. Being a moral person results from
a desire to be consistent with one’s moral concepts through which
individuals are motivated to gain independence from social
conventions. In contrast, people from Eastern cultures consider
a highly moral person to be societally oriented. In this moral
orientation, people tend to define themselves in the context of
collectivism and an interdependent self (Markus and Kitayama,
1991). Social relationships and group membership are linked to
the motivation to adjust to the demands of others and to maintain
harmony within one’s group (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Being
a moral person in Eastern societies may be more reflective of
group norms than of an individual’s morality.
Confucianism provides further support of the societally
oriented moral system in Eastern cultures. From the perspective
of Confucianism, understandings of morality help to socialize
individuals by encouraging them to suppress personal desires
in social interactions and to eliminate “Xiao Wo,” personal-
centered actions, by emphasizing “Da Wo,” societal-centered
actions instead (Hwang, 1999). As a consequence of Eastern
ideology, a highly moral person, “I,” is transformed into “we”
and, consequently, feelings of society within the group are
strengthened.
Chinese education system employed Confucian values of
effortful and respectful learning (Hwang, 1999). Consequently,
for 1000s of years, Chinese citizens were accustomed to
giving, obeying, and following authority. Extended families with
hierarchical relationships were also important in traditional
Chinese society. Moreover, in the contemporary Chinese history,
Cultural Revolution swept the nation in 1970s, driving Chinese
to “nation-oriented” collectivism (Yao, 2000). A very popular
Chinese analogy of this national value states that “Chinese people
are like bricks,” which means that all people have the same
functions and that they are willing to be assigned throughout the
society wherever ‘society’ needs them (Yao, 2000). Thus, Chinese
people should attribute national and societal meanings to the
concept of a highly moral person, based on the moral ideology
that nation is the most basic and important source of collective
identity.
CULTURAL APPROACH OF STUDYING
MORAL IDENTITY
Empirically, Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) note that the majority
of moral identity research is based on the Self-Importance of
Moral Identity Questionnaire (Aquino and Reed, 2002). This
measure provides participants with a list of nine attributes that
are characteristic of a highly moral person (caring, compassionate,
fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind).
However, recent research in virtue ethics, character education,
and political orientation across different cultures and religious
traditions has suggested that these are Western moral values
that need to be broadened (Miller, 2007). The description of
Western moral values may fail to adequately generalize the
values of other non-Western cultures because Western moral
values are limited to a Western understanding of morality. For
example, face is an interesting value that is of considerable
importance in many Eastern societies, although many Westerners
do not have a great understanding of it (Ting-Toomey, 1994).
In Western terminology, face is conceptualized as an individual’s
positioned identity (Hwang, 2006). In Eastern culture, face is
considered the social evaluation of one’s moral character, which
is the baseline of one’s integrity of personality (Hwang, 2006).
According to Confucian ethics, if any one member of the family
does something immoral, all family members may suffer from
loss of face (Hwang, 2006). In addition, other values such as
“culture of honor” (Leung and Cohen, 2011) and “filial piety”
(Hwang, 1999) need to be considered as moral values in non-
Western cultures. Thus, we suggest that culturally unique moral
values need to be generated through a comprehensive study of
the variance of cultural-specific moral identity in non-Western
cultures.
One practical methodology of getting one-step closer to
measure culturally non-biased moral identity is to create a
list of culturally inclusive moral values from both Western
and Eastern cultures. Frist, participants from each culture
(at least two countries) are asked to describe prototypical
conceptions of a highly moral person. For example, Walker and
Pitts (1998) asked 120 Canadian adults to generate personality
characteristics that were seen as descriptive of a highly moral
person using a free-listing procedure. The total number of
attributes provided by the participants was 1249. Several
judgment rules were used to reduce the number of descriptors
that participants had listed: any phrases and sentences were
divided into single descriptors; adjectives were used instead
of nouns; synonymous terms were combined; antonym pairs
which were generated less frequently were deleted; idiosyncratic
responses were eliminated (Walker and Pitts, 1998). Finally, 92
attributes as descriptive of a highly moral person were included
in the study. The similar procedure has also been used in US
(Aquino and Reed, 2002; Hardy et al., 2011).
However, prototypical conceptions of a highly moral person in
Eastern cultures have been neglected. We suggest first replicating
the previous procedure to ask participants from Eastern countries
(e.g., China, Korean, India) to free list moral values representing
Eastern view of a highly moral person. Second, the Eastern moral
values should be revised in accordance with the Walker and
Pitts’ (1998) judgment rules. Third, researchers should compare
the remaining Eastern moral values with the moral values
generated in Western culture. Common descriptors between
the two cultural lists should be identified as culturally shared
moral values. Unique descriptors between the two cultural lists
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should be observed as culturally non-shared moral values in each
culture. Finally, a joint list of shared and non-shared descriptors
exemplifies a culturally inclusive moral values that describes
a highly moral person in both Western and Eastern societies.
We suggest that researchers should consider this culturally
non-biased approach to investigate moral identities in different
cultures, although the procedure makes it a time-consuming
technique to use.
In a first study (Jia, 2016), we strived to identify value
attributes that describe individuals’ prototypical conceptions of
a “highly moral person” in Chinese culture. We asked 109
Chinese college students to write down at least 10 attributes of
a highly moral person in their points of view. A total of 1,924
attributes were created. In the second step, we applied the Walker
and Pitts’ (1998) procedure to reduce the number of attributes.
In the third step, we compared the remaining attributes with
a list of moral values frequently used from predominantly
Western cultures (Krettenauer et al., 2016). We found 17
culturally specific attributes from the Chinese sample: “peaceful,
credible, incorruptible, warm-hearted, motivated, ambitious,
diligent, civilized, patriotic, solidaric, careful, prudent, filial piety,
dedicated, principled, active, and outgoing.” In addition, we
found 17 unique Western attributes that Chinese participants
did not mention in their descriptions of a highly moral person.
Those attributes were “accepting, confident, consistent, educated,
follows the rules, fun, good, happy, has high standards, healthy,
humble, makes the right choices, non-judgmental, obedient, proper,
proud, religious.” The Chinese list used for defining a moral
person was illustrated by specific values that not only reflect
upon individually oriented morality such as “credible and
warm-hearted,” but also imply societally oriented morality (e.g.,
patriotic and prudent). There are certain concepts such as filial
piety and solidaric that have been mentioned in the literature
as specific Eastern values for a long time (Hwang, 1999). Other
attributes such as peaceful, principled, credible, and incorruptible
that are consistent with Confucian values of living in harmony
with others and societies.
CONCLUSION
Although we are certainly not the first to worry about
the generalizations of predominant Western theories and
methodologies in moral psychology, our efforts to compile
theoretical and empirical cases have revealed an alarming
situation in research concerning moral identity. Previous findings
maybe replicable across multiple samples in Western societies
using different methods such as self-report and interview and
those methods may be applicable to non-Western society;
however, researchers must also investigate the levels and degrees
to which the concept of moral identity can be accessible
across cultures (Henrich et al., 2010). Thus, we conclude: (1)
Conceptually, moral identity consists of both individual and
societal orientations; (2) Empirically, the study of moral identity
requires a culturally non-biased methodological tool.
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